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TARGET MARKETING OF SUBPRIME
LOANS: RACIALIZED CONSUMER
FRAUD & REVERSE REDLINING
Linda E. Fisher
This article, presented at Brooklyn Law School’s 2009
Sparer Public Interest Law Symposium on a panel
entitled Stopping the Next Subprime Crisis, is part of a
larger project of information and strategy-sharing among
academics, policy analysts and attorneys involved in
foreclosure and predatory lending prevention. The article
marshals and analyzes evidence of discriminatory and
deceptive marketing practices by subprime mortgage
lenders and brokers. It also supports current proposals
for policy reforms that could address the misuse of new
marketing technologies in this context.
INTRODUCTION
The subprime meltdown created many casualties. Foremost
among them are subprime borrowers themselves.1 While some
 Professor of Law, Seton Hall Law School. I would particularly like to
thank Arielle Cohen of the National Consumer Law Center (formerly with
the New Jersey Institute for Social Justice) for her assistance in researching
the practices I describe in this article. I am also grateful to Marc Poirier for
comments and suggestions on an earlier draft.
1
Michael Aleo & Pablo Svirsky, Foreclosure Fallout: The Banking
Industry’s Attack on Disparate Impact Race Discrimination Claims Under the
Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 18 B.U. PUB. INT.
L.J. 1, 1–8 (2008). Subprime loans are generally considered those with an
annual percentage rate (APR) on a first mortgage that is more than 3% above
the comparable Treasury rate. This figure is taken from the Federal
Reserve’s definition of high rate loans, which has developed into a shorthand
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commentators disparage these borrowers for defrauding lenders
by misstating their incomes, the reality is much more
complicated: evidence is mounting that certain subprime lenders
deliberately sought out financially vulnerable borrowers for
deceptive sales tactics and predatory mortgage loans. In many
cases, loan officers and mortgage brokers—without borrowers’
knowledge—concocted false income and assets and ordered
inflated appraisals, all to obtain mortgages generating large
profits for themselves.2 For some lenders, these techniques were
standard operating practice.3 There was little incentive to
working definition of subprime loans. See Alan M. White, Borrowing While
Black: Applying Fair Lending Laws to Risk-Based Mortgage Pricing, 60 S.C.
L. REV. 677, 682 (2009) (citing 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(12) and Robert B.
Avery et al., Higher-Priced Home Lending and the 2005 HMDA Data, FED.
RES. BULL. (Fed. Reserve Bd., Wash., D.C.), Sept. 8, 2006 at A123-24,
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2006/hmda/
bull06hmda.pdf); see also Aleo & Svirsky, supra, at 1–8 (setting forth a
comprehensive definition of subprime mortgages).
My point here is not that all subprime lenders engaged in predatory
lending, or that subprime lending is equivalent to predatory lending, but
rather that predatory lending was quite prevalent among subprime lenders.
The distinction between the two has been explored at length elsewhere. See
NAT’L PREDATORY LENDING TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP’T. OF HOUS. AND
URBAN DEV. & U.S. TREASURY DEP’T., CURBING PREDATORY HOME
MORTGAGE LENDING 17 (2000), available at http://www.huduser.org/
Publications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf [hereinafter PREDATORY LENDING REPORT];
JAMES H. CARR & LOPA KOLLURI, FANNIE MAE FOUNDATION, PREDATORY
LENDING: AN OVERVIEW 5–6 (2001), available at http://www.knowledge
plex.org/kp/text_document_summary/article/relfiles/hot_topics/Carr-Kolluri.
pdf; Creola Johnson, Fight Blight: Cities Sue to Hold Lenders Responsible for
the Rise in Foreclosures and Abandoned Properties, 2008 UTAH L. REV.
1169, 1174–75 (2008).
2
See infra text accompanying notes 69–81. Loan officers, mortgage
brokers and other originators were responsible at the ground level for
working with borrowers and preparing loan applications. See FINDING A
MORTGAGE FOR YOUR NEW HOME: BANKS VS. MORTGAGE BROKERS,
available
at
http://homebuying.about.com/cs/mortgagearticles/a/home_
lenders.htm. These terms are often used interchangeably. See infra note 44
(discussing the various ways in which originators and banks worked together
to fund mortgages).
3
For instance, Ameriquest and its affiliate Argent seem to have followed
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underwrite carefully because the funding lenders rarely kept the
loans in their own portfolios, but rather assigned them to
upstream purchasers for packaging into pools of mortgagebacked securities.4
Many of those perpetrating these deceptions employed target
marketing techniques to generate business. “Target marketing”
refers to the practice of developing profiles of desired consumers
and using those profiles to designate an audience for a product

these practices. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
4
See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall
Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2040–49
(2007); Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2185, 2207–13 (2007); Patricia McCoy & Elizabeth Renuart, Legal
Infrastructure of Subprime and Nontraditional Home Mortgages 34–40 (Joint
Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Working Paper No. UCC08-5, 2008), available at
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/understanding_consumer_cr
edit/papers/ucc08_5_mccoy_renuart.pdf; Benjamin J. Keys et al., Did
Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? 3 (Dec. 2008) (unpublished
manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1093137) (concluding that
portfolios that are more likely to be securitized default around 10–25% more
often than those of a similar risk profile group with a lower probability of
securitization); Amiyatosh Purnanandan, Originate-to-Distribute Model and
the Subprime Mortgage Crisis 2–3 (Apr. 27, 2009) (unpublished manuscript,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1167786).
For an explanation of the structure of securitized trusts, see NOMURA
FIXED INCOME RESEARCH, NOMURA SEC. INT’L, INC., MBS BASICS (2006),
available at http://www.securitization.net/pdf/Nomura/MBSBasics_31Mar06.
pdf and Charles K. Whitehead, The Evolution of Debt: Covenants, The Credit
Market, and Corporate Governance, 34 J. CORP. L. 641, 655–56 (2009)
(“Banks . . . became less interested in holding loans to their maturity in light
of the growing ability to enhance returns by selling loan interests to
others.”).
I use the past tense to refer to subprime lending because most subprime
lending has ceased in the past couple of years. See Peter M. Zorn et al.,
From FHA to Subprime and Back, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1365401. For example, twenty of the largest twenty-five subprime lenders are
no longer operating: some filed bankruptcy, some failed or are in
receivership, while others were purchased by larger entities. See John Dunbar
& David Donald, Who’s Behind the Financial Meltdown?, CENTER FOR
PUBLIC INTEGRITY, May 6, 2009, http://www.publicintegrity.org/
investigations/economic_meltdown/articles/entry/1286/.
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pitch.5 Employing techniques ranging from sophisticated
demographic analyses of defined geographic areas to
arrangements with local brokers in low-income urban
neighborhoods, these subprime lenders focused on borrowers
with little knowledge of mortgage lending in general and their
own financial options in particular.6 In fact, many subprime
borrowers apparently were sufficiently creditworthy to qualify
for prime loans, but were steered into higher cost subprime
loans anyway.7 Other lenders—or the brokers working with
them—specifically targeted borrowers already in financial
distress and foreclosure for refinancing.8 Mortgage loans with
unjustifiably high interest rates and higher principal balances
increased the stream of income for lenders and investors, and
resulted in larger commissions for loan officers and brokers;
higher points and fees added to the bottom line. This profit
5

See infra Part I.
This article focuses on the use of target marketing techniques in the
promotion of subprime loans in communities of color. Historically,
communities of color lacked access to mainstream financial institutions and
knowledge of the mortgage market. See Raymond H. Brescia, The Worst of
Times: Perspectives on and Solutions for the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2
ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 164, 172 (2009) (citing DAN IMMERGLUCK, CREDIT TO
THE COMMUNITY: COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT AND FAIR LENDING POLICY IN
THE UNITED STATES 87–108 (2004)) (analyzing discriminatory roots of the
subprime crisis and viability of reverse redlining claims under the Fair
Housing Act); Benjamin Howell, Comment, Exploiting Race and Space:
Concentrated Subprime Lending as Housing Discrimination, 94 CAL. L. REV.
101, 128–30 (2006).
Many homebuying and mortgage schemes have been perpetrated on
residents of black neighborhoods through the years, with their form varying
based on conditions at the time. E.g., BERYL SATTER, FAMILY PROPERTIES:
RACEL, REAL ESTATE, AND THE EXPLOITATION OF BLACK URBAN AMERICA
(2009) (recounting contract buying schemes in Chicago in the last century).
7
See CARR & KOLLURI, supra note 1, at 7 (“Credit quality
alone . . . does not fully explain the extreme reliance of black households on
the subprime market. Further research by Freddie Mac reports that as much
as 35 percent of borrowers in the subprime market could qualify for prime
market loans. Fannie Mae estimates that number closer to 50 percent.”);
White, supra note 1, at 688–89; infra, text accompanying note 50.
8
See infra note 103.
6
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making ultimately was detrimental to everyone, but perhaps
most of all to the borrowers, a high percentage of whom are or
will soon be in foreclosure.9
To further complicate the picture, African-American and
Latino borrowers took out disproportionately high rates of
subprime loans as compared to white borrowers.10 Of course, not
all subprime lending was predatory, but the incidence of
predatory practices such as those described here was
considerably higher for subprime as compared to prime
lending.11 The available evidence bears out this conclusion.12
A number of national studies, controlling for risk factors like
income and/or credit score, have substantiated the strong
correlation between race and subprime lending.13 Unsurprisingly,
9

See Associated Press, Mortgage Delinquencies Hit Record High in Q1,
N.J. STAR LEDGER, May 28, 2009 (“A record 12 percent of homeowners
with a mortgage are behind in their payments or in foreclosure . . . . At the
same time, almost half of all adjustable-rate loans made to borrowers with
shaky credit were past due or in foreclosure.”); Shane M. Sherlund, The
Past, Present, and Future of Subprime Mortgages 17 (Fed. Res. Bd.,
Working Paper No. 2008-63, 2008) available at http://www.federalreserve.
gov/Pubs/feds/2008/200863/200863pap.pdf. (“[M]ore recently originated
subprime loans are more likely to default, well ahead of their first mortgage
rate resets, and less likely to prepay (i.e., to refinance).”).
10
Brescia, supra note 6, at 173.
11
See PREDATORY LENDING REPORT, supra note 1. It is not my intent to
elide the distinction between predatory and subprime lending, but it is not a
primary focus of this paper. See supra note 1.
12
See infra text accompanying notes 70–90. The practices described
occurred almost exclusively with subprime and Alt-A loans, not prime loans.
See David Reiss, Regulation of Subprime and Predatory Lending,
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HOUSING AND HOME, available at
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cg?.article=1027&context=david_
reiss.
13
See White, supra note 1, at 687–89; DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN ET
AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, UNFAIR LENDING: THE EFFECT OF
RACE AND ETHNICITY ON THE PRICE OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGES 3 (2006)
available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/researchanalysis/unfair-lending-the-effect-of-race-and-ethnicity-on-the-price-ofsubprime-mortgages.html (“Our study analyzed subprime home loan prices
charged to different racial and ethnic groups while controlling for the effects
of credit scores, loan-to-value ratios, and other underwriting factors . . . .
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minority borrowers were significantly more likely than white
borrowers both to work with mortgage brokers and to take out
high-cost subprime loans.14 This correlation itself suggests
discrimination under either disparate treatment or disparate
impact theories; that is, African-Americans and Latinos were
either intentionally singled out for the worst loans or have
suffered disproportionately from the effects of facially neutral
lending policies.15 The phenomenon of singling out minorities for

Our findings show that, for most types of subprime loans, African-American
and Latino borrowers are at greater risk of receiving higher-rate loans than
white borrowers, even after controlling for legitimate risk factors.”); see
PREDATORY LENDING REPORT, supra note 1, at 3 (“HUD found that, even
after controlling for neighborhood income (although without controlling [sic]
for credit history or risk), people living in predominantly African-American
communities refinance in the subprime market much more often than people
living in predominantly white communities.”); NAT’L CMTY. REINVESTMENT
COAL., INCOME IS NO SHIELD AGAINST RACIAL DIFFERENCES IN LENDING II:
A COMPARISON OF HIGH-COST LENDING IN AMERICA’S METROPOLITAN AND
RURAL AREAS 3 (2008), available at http://www.ncrc.org/images/stories/
mediaCenter_reports/ncrc%20metro%20study%20race%20and%20income%2
0disparity%20july%2007.pdf (“[A]fter controlling for creditworthiness and
other housing market factors, minorities are receiving a disproportionately
large amount of high-cost loans.”); see generally MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER
& FELICITY SKIDMORE, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, MORTGAGE LENDING
DISCRIMINATION: A REVIEW OF EXISTING EVIDENCE (1999) available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/mortgage_lending.pdf
(reviewing
existing studies and evidence).
14
[A] significant factor causing minorities to pay higher mortgage
rates is their greater likelihood of getting a mortgage through a
broker rather than by dealing directly with lenders . . . . [O]ne-half
to two-thirds of the pricing disparity between whites and minority
borrowers results from the greater likelihood that minority borrowers
end up getting mortgages from subprime lenders . . . .[Minority
borrowers] are more likely to borrow from lenders that specialize in
subprime mortgages . . . and more likely to borrow through brokers
interacting with wholesale lenders.
White, supra note 1, at 687–88.
15
This article does not delve into fine points of the doctrine of disparate
treatment or disparate impact discrimination, which others have assessed at
length. See, e.g., Timothy C. Lambert, Comment, Fair Marketing:
Challenging Pre-Application Lending Practices, 87 GEO. L.J. 2181 (1999).
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predatory loans has been dubbed “reverse redlining.”16 This is a
reference to an inversion of the older practice of “redlining,” or
excluding minority neighborhoods altogether from mortgage
lending.17 Several state and local governments—in addition to
nonprofits and private plaintiffs—have sued subprime lenders
and brokers for engaging in these activities, alleging violations
of the federal Fair Housing and Equal Credit Opportunity Acts
and, in many cases, state consumer fraud statutes.18
The term racialized consumer fraud, as used in this article,
refers to the practice of aiming the most deceptive or
unconscionable lending practices at minorities. This article
focuses not only on evidence of this phenomenon, or on the link
between race and consumer fraud, but also on the extent to
16

See, e.g., City of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. L-08-62,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56794, at *1 (D. Md. July 2, 2009) (motion to
dismiss denied July 2, 2009); City of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
__ F. Supp. 2d __, 2010 WL 46401 (D. Md., Jan. 6, 2010) (granting motion
to dismiss); see also Johnson, supra note 1, at 118127 (examining costs of
foreclosures to cities, and current legal responses, including nuisance suits
filed by Cleveland and Buffalo, as well as the Baltimore litigation against
Wells Fargo).
17
Assocs. Home Equity Servs. v. Troup, 778 A.2d 529, 537 (App. Div.
2001) (“The term ‘redlining’ is derived from the actual practice of drawing a
red line around designated areas in which credit is to be
denied. . . . Congress has reported that ‘reverse redlining’ . . . [is] the
targeting of residents of those same communities for credit on unfair terms.”)
(citations omitted); see also Howell, supra note 6, at 105–16 (recounting
history of “America’s Racial Geography,” including redlining).
18
See NAACP v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., No. SACV 07-0794 AG,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66117 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2009); Wells Fargo, 2009
U.S. Dist. Lexis at 56794; Commonwealth v. H&R Block, Inc., No. 20082474BLS1, 2008 Mass. Super. LEXIS 427 (Super. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008). In
particular, the litigation between the city of Baltimore and Wells Fargo has
received a great deal of recent attention because of its revelations of the sort
of broker and loan officer conduct that is described here. See Julie Bykowicz,
City Can Proceed with Wells Fargo Lawsuit, BALTIMORE SUN, July 3, 2009,
at 10A (stating that federal district court denied motion to dismiss on July 2,
2009). Recently, the State of Illinois filed a similar suit against Wells Fargo.
Amy Merrick, Illinois Sues Wells Fargo Over Mortgage Discrimination,
WALL ST. J., July 31, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12
4906504187697487.html#.
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which target marketing techniques enabled these practices to
proliferate. Targeting did so by allowing the worst subprime
lenders to concentrate on consumers in narrowly defined
geographic or demographic niches and thus increased the
efficiency of predatory lending, afflicting entire neighborhoods.19
For example, patterns of residential segregation in this country
allow marketers to search by census tract, segments of a zip
code, or similar criteria to derive lists of potential customers that
strongly correlate with race, since residents of a single
neighborhood tend to be of the same race.20 In other words,
address often serves as a proxy for race. This paper also
suggests a possible link between the Furman Center’s findings,
as presented to this conference, of higher rates of subprime
lending to all borrowers living in predominantly minority
neighborhoods21 and the practices described herein; that is, when
majority minority areas are singled out and blanketed with
solicitations for predatory subprime loans, white residents of the
neighborhood can fall prey to these loans as well.22
19

See Alex Kotlowitz, All Boarded Up, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 8,
2009, at 28; Jenny Schuetz et al., Neighborhood Effects of Concentrated
Mortgage Foreclosures, 14–15 (Furman Ctr. for Real Estate and Urban
Policy, Working Paper 08–03, 2008), available at http://www.furmancenter.
org/files/foreclosures08-03.pdf.
20
See Ruth D. Peterson & Lauren J. Krivo, Race, Residence and Violent
Crime: A Structure of Inequality, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 903, 908 (2009) (“[I]n
2000, an average of 65.2% of metropolitan blacks (or whites) would have to
move to a different neighborhood to achieve an even residential
distribution.”); see also DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON,
AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE
UNDERCLASS 191 (1993).
21
Vicki Been et al., The High Cost of Segregation: Exploring Racial
Disparities in High-Cost Lending, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 361, 380–81
(2009); see also Kathe Newman & Elvin Wyly, Geographies of Mortgage
Market Segmentation: The Case of Essex County, New Jersey, 19 HOUSING
STUD. 53 (2004).
22
Been et al., supra note 21, at 382 (“[B]lack and white borrowers are
more likely to get a high-cost loan when they are buying a home in a census
tract that has a high proportion of blacks. Blacks and whites, in other words,
appear to be at a mortgage-cost disadvantage by buying homes in
neighborhoods with more black residents.”).
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This targeting did not always involve a conscious motive to
discriminate. There is a distinction between target marketing that
explicitly uses race as a criterion and that which uses geography.
A further distinction exists between intentionally using
geography as a proxy for race and targeting low-income urban
neighborhoods, though both created inequitable results in an
entirely predictable fashion, with minority borrowers receiving
much worse loans than similar white borrowers.23
Part I of this article describes the range of current target
market techniques and their adaptation to the subprime lending
context. Part II provides evidence of racialized consumer fraud
in subprime lending, relying on evidence obtained by counsel in
reverse redlining and consumer fraud lawsuits, accounts
published by the media, and reports I have gathered as a
practitioner in the field. Finally, Part III briefly examines
selected lawsuits challenging these practices that have recently
survived motions to dismiss or resulted in preliminary injunctive
relief. Given the evidence, this article argues for increased
enforcement of fair housing and lending laws in the mortgage
lending context. In addition, consumer financial services reforms
must take into account the pernicious use of new targeting
technologies and develop means to stanch it.
I. TARGET MARKETING
A. Introduction
In recent decades marketing techniques have become quite
sophisticated. Marketers can identify audiences most likely to
purchase products ranging from retail goods to financial
services. By dividing the population into niches according to
characteristics such as household composition, income, age,
employment, consumer spending, area of residence, and
language spoken, marketers can pinpoint potential customers
23

This article does not engage in a full doctrinal analysis of disparate
treatment and disparate impact fair housing/fair lending claims regarding
mortgage lending. For that analysis, see Lambert, supra note 15, at 2193–
97.
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with great refinement.24 Financial institutions use this process of
market segmentation,25 as it is called, to solicit those most likely
to apply for various types of mortgages or credit cards.26
Companies typically compile lists of target customers by first
culling their own records to determine who bought similar
products from them in the past.27 Next, they purchase reports on
these individuals from private services such as credit bureaus
that, in turn, have mined information from public records and
other sources to build a profile of each individual in the
database.28 That profile frequently includes residential
information broken down as finely as ZIP + 4.29 The dataset is
24

For example, the major credit bureaus offer these services. See Trans
Union Corp. v. FTC, 81 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Experian List Services
INSOURCE Enhancement and List Services, http://www.experian.com/
products/insource.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2009); TransUnion Business:
Prescreens and Lists, Sales Lead List Software, http://www.transunion.com/
corporate/business/serviceSolutions/marketingServices/prescreensLists.page
(last visited Sept. 12, 2009). Yahoo also offers marketing services for
businesses. Advertising Your Business with Yahoo! Search Marketing,
http://sem.smallbusiness.yahoo.com/searchenginemarketing/ (last visited Sept.
12, 2009).
25
See ART WEINSTEIN, HANDBOOK OF MARKET SEGMENTATION:
STRATEGIC TARGETING FOR BUSINESS AND TECHNOLOGY FIRMS (3rd Ed.
2004); Ross D. Petty et al., Regulating Target Marketing and Other RaceBased Advertising Practices, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 335 (2003).
26
See Dennis Gale, Subprime and Predatory Mortgage Refinancing:
Information Technology, Credit Scoring and Vulnerable Borrowers 9–10
(Fisher Ctr. for Real Estate and Urban Econ., Conference Paper C01-001,
2001), available at http://urbanpolicy.berkeley.edu/pdf/Gale.pdf (analyzing
effects of increasingly sophisticated technology, including “geodemographic
marketing tools” on predatory lending in early years of this decade).
27
Brad Stone, The Debt Trap: Banks Mine Data and Woo Troubled
Borrowers, N.Y. TIMES, October 22, 2008, fig. 1; Lambert supra note 15, at
2187–92 (1999) (describing these marketing techniques and assessing
applicability of fair housing and fair lending claims against their
discriminatory misuse).
28
Lambert, supra note 15, at 2187–88; see also Daniel J. Solove, Data
Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 343, 355–59
(2008) (discussing constitutional issues with respect to information collection
for data mining).
29
ZIP + 4 is a Post Office system of adding four additional digits after a
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then analyzed to identify additional common characteristics of
the pool of purchasers.30 After purchasing a new dataset of
additional consumers, the companies score individuals in the
new set according to their attractiveness as targets for future
solicitations.31
For example, an entity named Claritas, which is affiliated
with Nielsen (best known for its television audience surveys),
sells demographic information that can be very finely sliced
according to a purchaser’s preferences.32 One of its products,
suggestively called P$YCLE, divides people into fifty-eight
segments, each with a memorable name, including:
29. Retirement Ready—The nearly-retired Americans in
this segment enjoy comfortable lifestyles on middle-class
incomes. Although not asset-rich, members of Retirement
Ready do invest in real estate and variable-rate annuities,
and they’ve built up enough home equity to take out
second mortgages and home equity loans . . . .33
50. Urban Essentials—With their lower-income wages
and low levels of assets, they rank at the bottom for
savings, investments and retirement accounts. And many
of these urban renters go without auto, life or medical
insurance as well. A racially diverse mix of young, urban
singles, couples and families, this group is generally
limited in its financial behavior to taking out student and
zip code to break the area down into smaller segments to facilitate mail
delivery. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZIP_code; see also Direct
Marketing, Mail, Tele, Email and Fax Marketing Programs,
www.directmarketinglists.com/contentpages/mortgage.htm (last visited Sept.
18, 2009) [hereinafter Direct Marketing].
30
Stone, supra note 27, at fig.1.
31
Id.
32
Claritas—P$YCLE Segmentation System, http://www.claritas.com/
claritas/Default.jsp?ci=3&si=4&pn=psycle (last visited Sept. 10, 2009).
P$YCLE data is provided in a format that is designed to easily combine
credit information from the major credit bureaus and other information
sources to allow carefully targeted marketing. Id.
33
CLARITAS, IXPRESS FINANCIAL INSIGHT STANDARD COMPONENTS 162
(2007), available at www.claritas.com/collateral/data/col_ixpress_financial_
db.pdf.
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personal loans and using debit cards at ATMs. . . .34
54. City Strivers—The majority of residents are under 34
years old, have lower-middle incomes and have incomeproducing assets only a quarter of the national average.
Many are in debt paying off student, car or personal
loans—and with their modest bank accounts, they don’t
pursue long-term investments, retirement savings and life
insurance.35
Given the potential for misuse, segmentation becomes
problematic when race, or proxies for race, are incorporated
into defined categories. For instance, the last of P$YCLE’s
niches clearly references predominantly minority urban
populations:
58. Bottom-Line Blues—No segment has fewer incomeproducing assets, and few rank lower when it comes to
income or home ownership. Concentrated in inner-city
neighborhoods, the segment is the address for mostly
young, multi-ethnic singles and single-parent families
living in low-cost apartments.36
While ethnic segmenting is not illegal in itself, and can serve
seemingly legitimate purposes,37 it can be discriminatory when
combined with the other practices.38

34

Id. at 150.
Id.
36
Id. at 151. Arielle Cohen of the New Jersey Institute for Justice calls
this phenomenon “virtual redlining.” Correspondence from Arielle Cohen,
N.J. Inst. for Justice, to Linda E. Fisher, Professor of Law, Seton Hall Law
Sch. (September 23, 2008) (on file with author). This term alludes to the use
of information technology to cordon off demographic segments and deny
them the best credit opportunities. Id.
37
See, e.g., Target Market News, http://www.targetmarketnews.com
(last visited Aug. 27, 2009) (calling itself “The Black Consumer Market
Authority,” which serves as a conduit for products aimed at the black
community). I do not single out Claritas as an example of a particularly bad
actor—their services seem typical. See sources cited supra note 24.
38
See infra text accompanying notes 39–67.
35
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B. Target Marketing of Mortgages
As elaborated below, smaller scale, but similar, targeting
operations serve mortgage lenders exclusively and provide
consumer mortgage data to lenders and mortgage brokers.
Public records including recent home sales are merged with
mortgage data so that purchasers can identify prospective
customers for home equity loans or second mortgages.39 These
entities sell targeting lists containing name, address, date of sale,
current market value, loan amount, interest rate, credit score,
and foreclosure status. These lists may also offer telemarketing
scripts.40 Some combine neighborhood demographic and credit
39

See Direct Marketing, supra note 29.
First Mortgage File. This file contains homeowner information
dating back as early as the [sic] late 1988—over 50 million
properties spread across 50 states. From this database, selections can
be made on mortgage amount, origination date, lendable equity,
lender name and current home values. This database is primarily
used to identify homeowners with equity in their property that are
candidates for home equity loans.
Id. The company’s “Mortgage Profiling Credit Data” includes “Homeowner
Mortgage Leads,” described in relevant part as follows:
Sub-Prime: Sub-Prime auto prospects also make good home loan
refinance candidates. They are aware that their credit is not perfect
and are more flexible when it comes to interest rates, points, and
loan fees they are willing to pay to obtain financing.
Id.
40
See id. Another entity called Best Rate Referrals also sells mortgage
scripts for telemarketers pitching targeted loans:
Our mortgage lead generation system and telemarketing mortgage
scripts have helped numerous clients increase their business
nationwide through telemarketing . . .
Quick Mortgage Scripts: Our telemarketing mortgage scripts prompt
immediate interest in the homeowner and produce results. These
mortgage scripts are perfect for loan officers and telemarketers. We
have scripts for all types of mortgage marketing campaigns such as
reverse mortgage, refinance, debt consolidation, ARMs, and real
estate scripts. Order today and receive a free mortgage lead
sheet. . . .
FHA / VA Streamline Mortgage Script Only $4.95
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data to create a credit profile for similar localities sharing
chosen characteristics.41 Thus, racial targeting can be easily
accomplished without knowing the race of individuals, given the
strong correlation between geography and race.42
On an even smaller scale, mortgage brokers also engage in
target marketing. They originated—or created—the majority of
mortgages in this country in the past decade, with even higher
percentages of subprime originations.43 Many subprime lenders
Mortgage Loan Modification Script Only $4.95
Mortgage Loan Modification Script Only $4.95
Reverse Mortgage Script Only $4.95
Refinance—Sub-Prime/Debt Consolidation Only $4.95
Refinance—Sub-Prime/Debt Consolidation Only $4.95
Refinance—ARM Script Only $4.95
Real Estate Lead Script Only $4.95
Real Estate Lead Script Only $4.95 . . .
Mortgage Script Rebuttals: Mortgage Script Rebuttals are essential
for generating interested mortgage prospects. Through our many
years of experience we have fine tuned rebuttals for every response
to spark interest in the prospect . . . .
2-Step Mortgage Lead Generation System Only $99.95 . . .
Hiring & Training Mortgage Telemarketers Only $99.95 . . .
We include everything you need to start generating mortgage leads
your first day of operation.
Telemarketing scripts, http://www.bestratereferrals.com/consulting.html (last
visited Sept. 18, 2009) (emphasis in original).
41
Direct Marketing, supra note 29. The Sinclair Company, for instance,
informs customers: “[b]y combining summarized credit statistics with other
demographic selections you can identify the best candidates for your special
offer.” Id. But it also warns: “[l]ists developed with statistics must be used in
a positive or inclusive manner. The information cannot be used to deny or
exclude customers from any offer.” Id.
42
See supra text accompanying note 20.
43
See KEITH ERNST ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, STEERED
WRONG: BROKERS, BORROWERS, AND SUBPRIME LOANS 6 (2008), available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/
steered-wrong-brokers-borrowers-and-subprime-loans.pdf.
While mortgage brokers are active across the entire credit spectrum,
they have played a major role in the rapid growth of the subprime
mortgage market. . . . This growth was driven by the willingness of
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worked primarily with brokers, rather than employing their own
loan officers to originate loans.44 Through their wholesale
lending divisions, the lenders relied on a variety of arrangements
to fund loans originated by brokers.45 Brokers were paid with
commissions or other premiums.46 The brokers in turn employed
numerous methods to find customers, including targeted
techniques such as those previously described.47 Notably, they
subprime lenders to rely on third-party originators. Rather than build
brick and mortar storefronts, subprime lenders have recruited
brokers and, to a lesser degree, correspondent lenders to market and
originate their loans. Together, the loans originated by these thirdparty originators are described as “wholesale” loans. . . . By
2006, . . . estimates from trade publications reported that such loans
accounted for 63 to 81 percent of all subprime loans.
Id.
44

Id. Lenders would reach out to brokers in a number of different ways,
including online business. Interview with Jon Steingraber, Realtor, in
Newark, N.J. (Sept. 2008). In some cases, lenders would advertise the
availability of mortgages with specified terms to borrowers meeting certain
profiles; brokers would respond if they had contact with a borrower meeting
the criteria. Id.
45
See Dominick A. Mazzagetti, Dealing with Mortgage Loan Brokers:
Legal and Practical Issues, 114 BANKING L.J. 923, 932 (1997). This excerpt
describes the varieties of lender/broker (often referred to as “originator”)
relationships, including:
Category 1: The lender purchases whole loans after closing. The
lender provides little or no input during the origination process.
Category 2: The lender purchases whole loans after closing but has
substantial input in underwriting, compliance, and documentation.
Category 3: The lender ‘table funds’ loans originated and closed in
the name of the originator.
Category 4: The lender ‘table funds’ loans originated and closed in
the name of the lender.
Category 5: The lender becomes involved in loans immediately after
application, issues commitments in its own name, and closes the
loans in its own name.
Id.
46
See infra text accompanying note 99.
47
On September 23, 2008, Arielle Cohen posted an inquiry on
LinkedIn—“How do mortgage brokers get leads?”—and received these
responses:
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also depended heavily on local resources, such as realtors and
neighborhood word-of-mouth.48 Lenders could also choose to do
1. Hi. You can do title searches with title companies. Just give them
the criteria for the type of geography, tax liens, foreclosures, loan
amounts, lender, even Spanish speakers, loan origination dates etc.
They can usually do a detailed search for free. Of course they expect
your business [sic].
2. I’ve used leads generated from databases with homeowner
information, along with those that contained credit information. I’m
not sure the exact type of data you are looking for but feel free to
contact me with any specific questions you may have.
3. I agree with the above responses . . . . Most of the mortgage
brokers and loan officers that I work with get their leads/referrals
from realtors. However, I am also a great source of leads for
them... my company provides leads based on a number of variables
and criteria and are already scrubbed through the DNC [do not call]
list. These databases utilize category searches based on zip codes,
existing lender information, current interest rate and loan types, etc.
4. This is one of the biggest mailing list suppliers in the country:
http://www.usadata.com/?gclid=CKvs7uiI45UCFQgRFQodixHGfQ
[.] You can refine the search list as much as you want. The more
detailed list you want the more the list will cost. Meaning if you
want a list of men and women the price might be X. But if you want
a list of men and women between 25-35 the list might cost you
XXX. A lot of information can come with the list and it costs money
for each additional item. I am interested in what your [sic]
investigating. Don’t you work for a non-profit group.
5. At height of the market the most successful mortgage brokers
were getting the majority of their leads from strong relationships
with realtors. Although the amount of sales activity in almost every
market has decreased this is still the case. However, in this
environment you will need to make sure to develop a strong lender
network in order to capitalize on those relationships. It will also be
imperative to affiliate yourself with an FHA lender, as I believe this
will fill the void of the sub-prime business. In regards to using
databases, I have had clients that have been successful using leads
from title companies and lead generation companies. You can also
combine these lists with a refractive dialer, to maximize the results.
Posting of Arielle Cohen to LinkedIn profile page, http://www.linkedin.com
(Sept. 23, 2008) (on file with the author).
48
See id. In my own experience litigating predatory lending cases, the
brokers involved had connected with the borrower through local
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business predominantly with brokers in selected neighborhoods.
The targeting techniques described in this article made
identification of those brokers simple.
C. Targeting of African-American and Latino Borrowers for
Subprime Mortgages
As described above, mortgage brokers played a particularly
pivotal role in subprime lending to minorities during the peak
years of subprime lending.49 In addition to obtaining lists of
potential customers in a designated area, the brokers utilized ties
to local institutions and informal networks to tailor their sales
pitches to residents’ perceived preferences and affiliations.50
Brokers’ neighborhood ties gave them direct access to
potential customers who might not respond as readily to direct
mail or telemarketing solicitations. Moreover, subprime brokers
frequently were of the same race as most residents of the
neighborhoods in which they worked, increasing the likelihood
that they would be trusted.51 The limited financial options
available to most black borrowers created vulnerability to these
pitches, augmenting their attractiveness.52 Moreover, borrowers’
neighborhood networks. See, e.g., Complaint at ¶ 31, Gibson v. Bethea, No.
L–5364–08 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div, Essex County Ct. 2008); Ted
Sherman, Investors File Lawsuit Alleging Mortgage Con, N.J. STAR LEDGER,
July 1, 2008.
49
See supra text accompanying notes 1538.
50
I was involved in a case in which the pastor of a church was himself a
mortgage broker peddling subprime loans to parishioners and others. Pitman
v. Stroedecke, et al., No. ESX-L-4083 (Sup. Ct. of N.J., Essex County,
2004). In other cases, local real estate developers worked hand in hand with
mortgage brokers to convince local homebuyers to trust them, because they
shared the same race and/or religion. E.g., Gibson Complaint, supra note 48,
at ¶ 36; see also Philip Shishkin, When Rescue Means Eviction, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 25, 2009 (featuring a case I litigated in New Jersey and recounting other
cases around the country in which real estate brokers and developers gained
the trust of homeowners in trouble, bought their homes, and defrauded them).
51
See Barkley v. Olympia Mortgage Co., No. 04-CV-875, 2007 WL
2437810, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2007); Hargraves v. Capital City
Mortgage Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 7, 21–22 (D.D.C. 2000).
52
See Dorothy A. Brown, Shades of the American Dream, 87 WASH U.
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lack of financial sophistication also increased the likelihood that
they would trust and believe salespeople who seemed genuinely
concerned for their welfare. When the homeowners were facing
bankruptcy or foreclosure, desperation often overrode their
better judgment.53
In one variation, predatory property flippers, working with
mortgage brokers and others, would solicit first-time minority
homebuyers with “one-stop shopping” schemes that involved
purchasing and financing sales of substandard homes.54 The
flippers make false promises to the buyers and misrepresent the
condition and cost of the homes. The brokers and their coconspirators then put the borrowers into predatory loans. Both
use the targeting techniques described in this article to lure in
unsuspecting buyers. A typical example is described in Barkley
v. United Homes.55 First, the flippers used targeted advertising
56
“featuring minority consumers.” They also “placed ads in the
Caribbean Life community newspaper that serves the West
Indian immigrant community, while not advertising in
community papers that are part of the same newspaper chain but
serve primarily white neighborhoods.”57 Finally, they used
“race-conscious outreach strategies” such as pairing salesmen

L. R. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 20, 4950, available at
http://www.law.emory.edu/fileadmin/faculty_documents/dabrown7/Shades_La
w_Review_Version.doc_compatability_Mode_.pdf) (discussing [at n. 58 &
71] reasons why black renters have been less likely to apply for mortgages
than whites, and why, when investing, blacks have often preferred to invest
conservatively in real estate as opposed to stocks or bonds).
53
This has frequently been my own experience, as well as that of
consumer attorneys in general. See, e.g., Colson v. Reed, No. L-5294-97
(Sup. Ct. of N.J., Essex County), as well as the cases referred to supra.
54
See Barkley, 2007 WL 2437810. I have litigated similar cases in the
Newark area. See, e.g., Gibson v. Bethea, No. L–5364–08 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div, Essex County Ct. 2008).
55
Barkley, 2007 WL 2437810 (denying motion to dismiss in property
flipping case with claims against scammers under 42 U.S.C. §§ 198182,
1985(3)).
56
Id. at *11.
57
Id.
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and buyers of the same race.58 I have seen several such examples
in my own litigation practice in Newark.59
Certain subprime lenders bypassed brokers and directly
targeted their products to specific African-American and
Hispanic divisions, euphemistically referred to as “Emerging
Markets Departments.”60 Recent affidavits from former Wells
Fargo employees submitted in the City of Baltimore v. Wells
Fargo litigation, discussed infra, provide details.61 For instance,
58

Id. Other documented examples in reported cases include Hargraves v.
Capital City Mortgage Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 7, 21–22 (D.D.C. 2000)
(denying summary judgment where defendant mortgage company located its
offices in predominantly black communities, used local brokers, distributed
targeted flyers and ads in the same neighborhoods, and “exhibited photos of
famous black leaders standing with the company’s president in an alleged
‘attempt to convey a message to African-Americans that [the president] could
be trusted.’”); and Honorable v. Easy Life Real Estate Sys., Inc., 182
F.R.D. 553, 561 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1998) (certifying class in Fair Housing
Act case and relying on allegations that “defendants preyed on the plaintiff
class by targeting their advertising to unsophisticated, first-time home buyers
in the racially segregated Austin community, materially misrepresenting the
condition and value of homes offered for sale . . .”).
59
See Complaint, Gibson v. Bethea, No. L–5364–08 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div, Essex County Ct. 2008).
60
See, e.g., Business Wire, Option One Appoints Larry Gilmore Vice
President of Emerging Markets, ALL BUS., April 7, 2006, http://www.all
business.com/banking-finance/banking-lending-credit-services-mortgage/
5466275-1.html.
Minority homeownership rates are still a fraction of that of the
general population, and shifting demographics and demographic
growth among all minorities make understanding the needs of
emerging markets more important now than ever . . . . “We’re
developing a long-term strategy in Emerging Markets that will
include the new type outreach and partnerships to provide the best
quality services,” said Gilmore. “We will also look at developing
unique products to meet the needs of our country’s diverse
population.”
Id.
61
See Affidavit of Elizabeth Jacobson, Mayor of Baltimore v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 08-cv-00062 (D. Md. June 1, 2009) (opposing Wells
Fargo’s motion to dismiss and submitted as Attachment M to Baltimore’s
Amended Complaint); Affidavit of Tony Paschal, Wells Fargo, No. 08-cv-
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the Emerging Markets manager informed one employee that she
was “too white” to appear at a “wealth building” seminar in an
African-American community and discuss “alternative lending,”
the bank’s code for subprime lending.62 Another Wells
employee, who worked in a division targeting zip codes with
predominantly black populations, related that fellow employees
referred to subprime loans as “ghetto loans.”63 Further, he
explained that the bank had software to generate marketing
materials for minorities, including a flyer “to persons speaking
the language of ‘African-American.’”64
The lenders tailored their advertising and sales pitches to
these populations, and operated out of branch offices in or near
targeted neighborhoods.65 Some would blanket the neighborhoods
with flyers featuring photos of black or Latino customers and
public figures.66 Again, while targeting is not per se
00062 (opposing Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss and submitted as
Attachment N to the Amended Complaint); see also Complaint, People v.
Wells Fargo & Co., No. 09CH26434 (Ill. Ch. Div., Cook County Ct. July
31,2009).
62
Jacobson Affidavit, supra note 61, at ¶ 29.
63
Pascal Affidavit, supra note 61, at ¶ 8.
64
Id. at ¶ 11.
65
See Ramirez v. Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc., No. C080369,
2008 WL 2051018, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2008) (noting lender branches
were located in white neighborhoods, while broker outposts were located in
minority neighborhoods, with brokers frequently charging more fees than
lenders); Johnson v. Equicredit Corp. of Am., No. 01C5197, 2002 WL
448991, at *1 (N.D. Ill. March 22, 2002) (noting prime lender Bank of
America located more often in white neighborhoods, while its subprime
subsidiary Equicredit had offices almost exclusively located in minority
neighborhoods). Two students of mine who were former employees of
subprime lenders confirmed these lender tactics with me, as did Tamara
Loatman-Clark, the attorney I have worked with who was interviewed by the
American News Project. Interviews with Aaron Gould (Dec. 22, 2008); D.B.
(July 15, 2007) and Tamara Loatman-Clark (May 4, 2009), Newark, New
Jersey.
66
See Hargraves v. Capital City Mortgage Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 7,
2122 (D.D.C. 2000). A former student of mine described a situation in
which acquaintances blanketed a minority neighborhood with racially targeted
flyers at the behest of a local mortgage broker. See Interview with Aaron
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discriminatory, it easily becomes so when the loans offered
contain terms significantly worse than those offered to similarly
situated white borrowers, which was the norm in the instances I
recounted.67
II. CONSUMER FRAUD IN PREDATORY SUBPRIME LENDING
The phenomenon of predatory subprime lending is by now
well documented and has been defined and described in detail
68
elsewhere. Although no single definition of predatory lending
exists, the phenomenon generally encompasses a variety of
deceptive and unconscionable commercial practices that also
constitute violations of unfair and deceptive acts and practices—
or consumer fraud—statutes.69 In the mortgage lending context,
these practices usually began with solicitations and aggressive,
overbearing sales tactics employed against a financially
unsophisticated target population. Typically, borrowers in
foreclosure or those with low incomes but substantial equity in
their homes would be solicited for refinances. For example, the
Ninth Circuit upheld a jury verdict in a fraud class action
against First Alliance Mortgage Company, which employed

Gould, supra note 65.
67
See infra note 117 and accompanying text (describing the preliminary
injunction obtained by the Massachusetts Attorney General in a reverse
redlining suit against subprime lender Option One and H & R Block); see
also Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Mortgage Lender Agrees to Settle
FTC Charges that it Charged African-Americans and Hispanics Higher Prices
for Loans (Dec. 16, 2008), available at http://www. ftc.gov.
68
See generally RICHARD BITNER, CONFESSIONS OF A SUBPRIME
LENDER: AN INSIDER’S TALE OF GREED, FRAUD, AND IGNORANCE (2008)
(detailing the rise and fall of the subprime lending market); Johnson, supra
note 1, at 117880 (explaining predatory subprime loans); Frank Lopez,
Using the Fair Housing Act to Combat Predatory Lending, 6 GEO. J.
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 73, 76–80 (1999).
69
See generally CAROLYN CARTER & JONATHAN SHELDON, UNFAIR AND
DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES (Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr. 7th ed., 2008).
A number of federal statutes, such as the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1601 et seq., may also apply. E.g., Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(RESPA), 12 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq.
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scripted sales pitches to mislead mostly elderly borrowers about
loan costs.70 The jury also found Lehman Brothers liable for
aiding and abetting the fraud by financing the loans.71
Frequently, outright fraud was involved in the origination of
predatory loans: brokers or loan officers falsified income and
asset information on borrowers, and ordered inflated appraisals
that overstated the value of the property.72 Over and over again
in my litigation practice representing borrowers who unwisely
trusted local brokers, I have seen mortgage applications filled
out by brokers and loan officers—without borrower
involvement—that contain wild exaggerations of the borrowers’
income and assets.73 As a result of this fraud, the homeowners
70

See, e.g., In re First Alliance Mortgage Co., 471 F.3d 977 (9th Cir.
2006) (upholding jury verdict in fraud class action against mortgage company
that employed scripted sales pitch to mislead borrowers about loan costs; also
upholding verdict against Lehman Bros., which financed the loans).
Moreover, it should be noted that subprime borrowers were not
unwittingly pulled into bad loans, and some seem to have overstated their
income—rather than having a mortgage broker fill out their loan application.
However, I have not seen evidence of that in my own practice representing
borrowers in predatory lending litigation in New Jersey, although I do see
evidence of broker fraud regularly. See Kareem Fahim, In New Jersey,
Dreams of a Better Life Dashed by Foreclosure Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, May 19,
2009.
71
First Alliance, 471 F.3d at 989.
72
See, e.g., Road to Ruin: Mortgage Fraud Scandal Brewing, Huffington
Post, May 13, 2009 available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2009/05/12/road-to-ruin-mortgage-fra_n_202016.html. Tamara LoatmanClark, a Brooklyn attorney and former employee of subprime lender Argent,
is interviewed in this video about the fraudulent practices she observed at
Argent; I am also interviewed. Id.; see also DENISE JAMES ET AL.,
MORTGAGE ASSET RESEARCH INST., ELEVENTH PERIODIC MORTGAGE FRAUD
CASE REPORT TO: MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION (2009) (reporting that
incidents of mortgage fraud increased 26% between 2007 and 2008),
available at http://www.marisolutions.com/pdfs/mba/mortgage-fraud-report11th.pdf.
73
This practice has been documented by the FBI and others. See, e.g.,
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 2008 MORTGAGE FRAUD REPORT “YEAR IN
REVIEW” (2009) [hereinafter FBI 2008 REPORT], available at
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/fraud/mortgage_fraud08.htm#3 (describing
nature and incidence of current fraud schemes). This practice occurred in
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were induced to take out mortgages with onerous terms that
were unsuited to them and impossible to repay.74
Thus, after paying unconscionable closing costs,75 borrowers
were saddled with mortgages whose principal balance exceeded
fair market value and whose terms were not disclosed to them.76
During the peak subprime lending years of 2004 through 2006,77
so-called “exotic mortgages” with high adjustable rates setting in
after a trial period, interest-only mortgages that were negatively
amortizing, and similarly onerous loans were taken on by many
borrowers who lacked a full understanding of the terms of their
loan.78 Moreover, many subprime borrowers actually had credit
scores sufficient to qualify for prime mortgages but were steered
into subprime loans that were more profitable to lenders.79
Others took out refinance loans with high fees that rolled
their unsecured credit card debt into secured debt.80 Indeed,
some lenders promoted this practice as part of their lending
strategy, and encouraged serial refinances because they made
additional fees on each transaction.81 Deceptive sales pitches that
almost every subprime lending case I have litigated in the last five years.
74
See Engel & McCoy, supra note 4 at 2043.
75
See MELISSA HUELSMAN, A BRIEF PRIMER ON PREDATORY LENDING
PRACTICES (ABA General Practice Section Newsletter, Sept., 2005),
available at http://www.abanet.org/genpractice/newsletter/lawtrends/0509/
business/predatorylending.html.
76
Over appraisals resulted in loans that were underwater from the
beginning, because the homes were never worth as much as the inflated
appraisal indicated. See generally BITNER, supra note 68 (discussing appraisal
fraud).
77
See Edmund L. Andrews, Fed Shrugged as Subprime Crisis Spread,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2007.
78
Engel and McCoy, supra note 4, at 2076.
79
See supra note 7.
80
See LISA JAMES & JABRINA ROBERTS, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE
LENDING, RISKING HOMES TO PAY OFF CREDIT CARDS 1–2 (2005), available
at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/credit-cards/research-analysis/ip012Risking_Homes_Credit_Cards-1105.pdf.
81
A former student of mine worked for HSBC’s subprime unit several
years ago. Interview with Aaron Gould, HSBC, in Newark, N.J. (Dec. 16,
2008). He described how the bank would draw people into high-interest loans
and solicit them again for mortgage refinancing after the original loans’ terms
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misrepresented the terms and nature of these mortgage products
were frequently used.82 Whether lenders relied on brokers or
their own loan officers to originate loans, they often engaged in
scant underwriting and made few efforts to verify the legitimacy
of the applications and documentation presented to them.83
Because it was more profitable to flip the loans upstream than to
fully confirm the information provided on loan applications, that
step was bypassed and mortgages were quickly assigned to
securitizers.84
Although these widespread practices occurred before the
recent financial meltdown all but eradicated subprime lending, it
should be noted that mortgage fraud, far from abating, has only
85
expanded since the foreclosure crisis began. The perpetrators
became impossible to meet. Id. The strategy was to put borrowers into a
position of increasing financial desperation, which would break down their
resistance to taking out a new loan with unfavorable terms. Id. See also
Daniel Wagner, Bank Employees Protest “Anti-Consumer” Practices, ABC
NEWS,
June
29,
2009,
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?
id=7961452 (“Bank of America and other large banks encouraged customer
service representatives and tellers to burden consumers with debt and enroll
them in high-fee programs . . . .”).
82
Engel & McCoy, supra note 4, at 2088; see also supra text
accompanying notes 49–57.
83
I have frequently seen loan applications containing obviously false
information accepted and funded by subprime and Alt-A lenders. Stories of
cases resulting in convictions around the country are reported daily by The
Mortgage Fraud Reporter, Mortgage Fraud News, http://www.mortgage
fraud.org/journal (last visited Aug. 27, 2009). See also Keys et al., supra
note 4 (listing lax underwriting at origination as a cause of later default).
84
See Engel & McCoy, supra note 4, at 2039–43.
85
See, e.g., FBI 2008 REPORT, supra note 73 (describing nature and
incidence of current mortgage fraud schemes); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Treasury, Federal, State Partners Announce Multi-Agency Crackdown
Targeting Foreclosure Rescue Scams, Loan Modification Fraud, Apr. 6,
2009, available at http://www/treas.gov/press/releases/tg83.htm (describing
incidence of mortgage fraud). Recently, federal and state authorities have
been prosecuting foreclosure rescue scammers both criminally and civilly as
such schemes have proliferated, but I have been involved in litigating these
cases for over ten years. In April of this year, the President also signed into
law the Fraud Enforcement Recovery Act of 2009, which provides expanded
enforcement powers to federal prosecutors in this area. See Fraud
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adapt to the times and craft their pitches to address changing
circumstances. In one variation—which began years ago but has
become quite common recently—mortgage brokers work with
foreclosure rescue scammers to target homeowners in
foreclosure, offering to “temporarily” purchase their homes and
rent them to the victims while they attempt to repair their credit.
A straw purchaser takes title and finances the purchase with a
mortgage arranged by the broker. The scammers then leave the
former owners without title to the home, may evict the tenants
and resell the property, use the sale to skim equity from the
home and then let it fall into foreclosure, or otherwise profit
from the transaction at the expense of the former homeowners.86
This pattern, as described in the New York case of Watson v.
Melnikoff, is typical and has been replicated across the country.87
Another prevalent variation involves loan modification
scams.88 In the wake of the widely-publicized efforts of
Enforcement Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–21, 123 Stat. 1617
(2009); see also Howard Goodman, The Fraud Squad, HUFFINGTON POST,
June 22, 2009, www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/6/22/the-fraud-squad_n_
218910.html (describing the Act and current efforts to attack new mortgage
frauds in South Florida).
86
I have represented numerous clients victimized by similar scams, and
the New Jersey Attorney General’s office is currently proceeding against a
number of large foreclosure rescue rings. See, e.g., Press Release, N.J.
Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General Announces Mortgage Fraud
Lawsuits: 10 Defendants Charged in Two Separate Loan Modification Cases
(July 15, 2009), available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases09/pr2009
0715a.html. Similar stories from across the country are common. See also
FBI REPORT, supra note 73 (describing the varieties of mortgage fraud).
87
Watson v. Melnikoff, 19 Misc. 3d 1130(A), (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008)
(quieting title in favor of plaintiff and voiding fraudulent mortgage and title
transfer). See also In Re Curriden, No. 05-38352, 2007 WL 2669431 (Bankr.
D.N.J. Sept. 6, 2007). Another current problem for homeowners is that
many subprime lenders failed to escrow for property taxes, leaving borrowers
unaware that their taxes were not being paid. Many tax foreclosures have
resulted. See Editorial, Another Way to Lose the House, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
27, 2009.
88
See Tara Siegel Bernard, Avoiding Firms that Prey on Troubled
Homeowners, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2009; Peter S. Goodman, Subprime
Brokers Back as Dubious Loan Fixers, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2009, available
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government and nonprofit agencies to assist homeowners to
modify their mortgages, a new generation of scammers has
rushed in.89 Many are former mortgage brokers90 who falsely
represent to borrowers that they must pay to obtain the services
of a loan expert. In this way, the scammers demand substantial
upfront fees.91 At best, these scammers do little more for
borrowers than make a few phone calls, or engage in other
efforts that borrowers could obtain elsewhere at no cost.92 At
worst, they just take the money and run, leaving homeowners
with false hopes and no avenue of redress.93
III. THE RACIALIZATION OF CONSUMER FRAUD & REVERSE
REDLINING
Predatory lending and consumer fraud occur when loan
terms and fees cross the threshold of unconscionability, or when
borrowers are enticed by deceptive sales practices and
misrepresentations.94 Unsurprisingly, these practices have often
been aimed at distinct segments of the population thought to be
financially vulnerable—minorities, seniors, and sometimes single
women.95 As recounted previously, black and Latino borrowers
at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/20/business/20modify.html.
89
See Bernard, supra note 88.
90
See Goodman, supra note 88.
91
See Bernard, supra note 88.
92
See Goodman, supra note 88.
93
See Bernard, supra note 88. Yet another recent variation involves
targeting senior citizens for reverse mortgages, by sending them officiallooking correspondence that appears to be from a government agency, cites
various federal laws, and seems to offer government benefits. For example,
a Sept. 4, 2009 letter from HECM Disbursement, Washington D.C., entitled
Section 255 of the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C. 1715z-20) is amended:
Notification of Eligibility: Identification Papers Issued to Received as Filed, is
actually from the Eagle Nationwide Mortgage Company (on file with author).
94
See supra text accompanying notes 68–69.
95
See PEDATORY LENDING REPORT, supra note 1, at 4–5 (“[M]inorities,
women, and the elderly bear the brunt of abusive mortgage lending practices,
particularly in predominantly minority or low-income neighborhoods that do
not have access to mainstream sources of credit.”).
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in particular received a disproportionate share of the highest-cost
subprime mortgages with less favorable terms than those made
to similar white borrowers, even after controlling for risk-related
factors.96 Targeted marketing of these mortgages amplified and
intensified the worst lending practices by increasing both the
pool of borrowers and their susceptibility to manipulative sales
pitches.
As set forth in many of the recent reverse redlining
complaints surviving motions to dismiss, subprime lenders
facilitated discriminatory lending by using discretionary pricing
policies that encouraged mortgage brokers and loan officers
working in minority neighborhoods to oversell.97 For instance,
brokers received yield spread premiums, a form of commission,
for placing borrowers into loans with higher interest rates than
par, the rate for which the borrowers actually qualified.98 The
96

See BOCIAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 3; PREDATORY LENDING
REPORT, supra note 1, at 3; see also Paul Jackson, NY AG: Mortgage
Brokers Admit to Fee Gouging, Discrimination, HOUSINGWIRE, Jan. 6, 2009,
http://www.housingwire.com/2009/01/06/ny-ag-firms-settle-predatory-lending
-claims/ (reporting that as part of settlement with the New York Attorney
General, brokers admitted charging higher fees to hundreds of black and
Latino borrowers).
97
See Brescia, supra note 6 (analyzing discriminatory roots of the
subprime crisis and viability of reverse redlining claims under the Fair
Housing Act); John L. Ropiequet & L. Jean Noonan, Recent Developments in
Fair Lending: The Dawn of a New Litigation Era?, 64 BUS. LAW. 563, 564
(2009); Stuart T. Rossman, The Foreclosure Crisis: Can Impact Litigation
Provide a Response?, in 13TH ANNUAL CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES
LITIGATION INSTITUTE COURSE HANDBOOK, 195, 20204 (Practicing Law
Inst. Ed., 2008); Christopher J. Willis & Catherine S. Bernard, Recent
Subprime Mortgage Lending Class Actions Under the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act and Fair Housing Act: An Analysis of Class Certification
Issues, in 13TH ANNUAL CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES LITIGATION
INSTITUTE COURSE HANDBOOK, 163, 165 (Practicing Law Inst. Ed., 2008).
Although the discretionary pricing policies were applicable to all borrowers,
brokers and loan officers working in minority neighborhoods allegedly
pushed local borrowers harder than white borrowers were pushed to take out
high-cost loans that yielded higher commissions. See, e.g., Martinez v.
Freedom Mortgage Team, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 827, 835 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
98
Loan officers and brokers could be entitled to a percentage of the
difference in revenue to the lender resulting from the higher rate loan. Ware
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discretionary pricing policies also allowed brokers to profit from
charging additional non-risk based fees99 to borrowers.100 Brokers
were therefore incentivized to steer unwitting borrowers,
including those with good credit who could have qualified for
better terms, to the highest-cost loan products.101
Making matters worse, brokers—and some lenders—
frequently targeted minority neighborhoods because they
assumed residents would respond favorably to their pitches for
these high-cost loan products.102 This is because borrowers with
few financial options, or those unaware of other options, were
more likely to take out higher-rate loans through subprime
originators working in their neighborhoods.103 Moreover,
brokered loans tend to cost more than direct loans—generating
fees for brokers and lenders—and loans given in minority
neighborhoods were more likely to be brokered than in white
104
neighborhoods. The lenders funding these loans allegedly

v. Indymac Bank, 534 F. Supp. 2d 835, 839 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
99
See White, supra note 1.
100
Guerra v. GMAC LLC, No. 2:08–cv–01297, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
449153, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2009); Ramirez v. Greenpoint Mortgage
Funding, No. C08-0369, 2008 WL 2051018, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. May 13,
2008).
101
Commonwealth v. H&R Block, No. 2008-2474BLS1, 2008 Mass.
Super. LEXIS 427, at *1 (Super. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008) (denying motion to
dismiss and granting preliminary injunction); Complaint at ¶¶ 40–43, People
v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 09CH26434 (Ill. Ch. Div., Cook County Ct. July
31, 2009).
102
See Carol Necole Brown, Intent and Empirics: Race to the Subprime
27–42 (Univ. of N.C. Research Paper No. 1426142, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1426142 (relying on cultural affinity hypothesis,
according to which lenders discriminate against borrowers with whom they
do not share a cultural affinity because they have no context to evaluate
creditworthiness, to explain racial targeting of subprime loans).
103
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
104
Many of the complaints also include allegations that the defendant
lenders worked with brokers more frequently in minority than in white
neighborhoods, and knew that brokered loans were more expensive than
direct loans. See, e.g., Ramirez, 2008 WL 2051018 at *1; see also White,
supra note 1, at 687–88.
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knew of the disparate racial impact of their pricing policies.105
Compounding the problem, lenders failed to conduct serious
underwriting, which encouraged originators to use inflated
appraisals that overstated the market value of a home.106 The
lack of underwriting also encouraged originators to falsify loan
applications by inflating a borrower’s actual income and
assets.107 Perhaps the greatest broker profits, however, came
from commissions and fees earned from increased lending
volume.108 Greater loan volume is precisely where careful
targeting produced the greatest rewards.
A number of the reverse redlining suits have been framed
exclusively as civil rights violations, with liability theories
premised upon violations of both the federal Fair Housing and
Equal Credit Opportunity Acts, which prohibit, respectively,
racially discriminatory actions affecting housing or the
availability of credit.109 For instance, the plaintiffs in the
105

See, e.g., Ware v. Indymac Bank, 534 F. Supp. 2d 835, 840 (N.D.
Ill. 2008); Martinez v. Freedom Mortgage Team, 527 F. Supp. 2d 827, 835
(N.D. Ill. 2007).
106
Ware, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 838–39; Barkley v. Olympia Mortgage Co.,
No. 04-CV-875, 2007 WL 2437810, at 1* (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2007).
107
Ware, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 838–39.
108
See ERNST ET AL., supra note 43, at 33 (“Brokers have strong
incentives to originate mortgages in large volume and relatively little
incentive to scrutinize whether the loans will perform over time.”).
High sales volume was particularly important where subprime loans
were bundled and sold into securitized pools, id., since the pools had to be
filled within ninety days to comply with tax law.
109
For example, many of these cases involve claims under the Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., and the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq. See Guerra v. GMAC LLC, No. 08-cv-01297,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 449153, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2009); Taylor v.
Accredited Home Lenders, 580 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1064 (S.D. Cal. 2008);
Miller v. Countrywide Bank, N.A., 571 F. Supp. 2d 251, 253 (D. Mass.
2008); Ramirez, 2008 WL 2051018, at *2; Zamudio v. HSBC N. Am.
Holdings, Inc., No. 07-c-4315, 2008 WL 517138, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20,
2008); Jackson v. Novastar Mortgage, No. 06-2249, 2007 WL 4568976, at
*1 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 20, 2007). Some of the complaints also allege
violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–82. See John Relman, Foreclosures,
Integration, and the Future of the Fair Housing Act, 41 IND. L. REV. 629
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representative disparate impact case of Miller v. Countrywide
Bank, N.A alleged that:
Countrywide’s Discretionary Pricing Policy has a
widespread discriminatory impact on African-American
applicants for home mortgage loans, in violation of the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act [citation omitted] and Fair
Housing Act [citation omitted]. That system . . . makes
African-Americans over three times more likely than
white borrowers to receive a high-APR [annual
percentage rate] home loan and two times more likely to
receive
a
high-APR
refinancing
loan.
The
disparity . . . is not fully explained by any objective
indicia of creditworthiness, such as credit history, credit
score, debt-to-income ratio, or loan-to-value ratio.
Instead, they argue that a significant portion of the
disparity is explained by Countrywide’s pricing policy,
which
explicitly
allows
for
subjective
price
markups . . . . These . . . have a disparate impact on
African-American home buyers.110
According to the court, these allegations sufficed to
withstand a motion to dismiss because the plaintiffs had
sufficiently pled that a specified policy was the proximate cause
of the racially disproportionate effects they challenged.111
The evidence in certain reverse redlining cases includes
practices that would constitute consumer fraud as well.112 The
City of Baltimore provided evidence that Wells Fargo employees
steered borrowers qualifying for prime loans to more costly
subprime loans by misleadingly telling minority applicants that
only subprime loans could be processed quickly and that
mandatory prepayment penalties could be waived, but not
113
informing them about the higher cost of subprime loans. State
(2008) (placing the Baltimore Wells Fargo litigation in broader legal context).
110
Miller, 571 F. Supp. 2d at 253 (internal citations omitted).
111
Id. at 255–58.
112
See supra text accompanying notes 72–84.
113
Jacobson Affidavit, supra note 61, at ¶¶ 12. Similar tactics apparently
extended to Wells Fargo’s efforts to hire loan officers. Several years ago, I
interviewed a former Wells Fargo subprime division employee who explained
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statutes typically prohibit the use of false and deceptive sales
tactics such as these. For instance, the New Jersey Consumer
Fraud Act prohibits the “act, use or employment . . . of any
unconscionable commercial practice, deception, fraud, false
pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the knowing
concealment, suppression or omission, in connection with the
sale or advertisement of any merchandise or real estate.”114
These practices were perpetrated disproportionately upon
African-American and Latino borrowers, and cannot be justified
on neutral business necessity grounds because white borrowers
with similar credit scores and other risk characteristics received
better loans than the inferior, high-cost products foisted on
minority borrowers. Thus, the acts alleged could constitute race
discrimination, as well as consumer fraud.115
Some reverse redlining suits, however, have asserted both
civil rights and consumer fraud violations.116 A prominent
example is State of Massachusetts v. H & R Block, et al., in
which a state court denied a motion to dismiss and issued a
preliminary injunction requiring Attorney General approval
before proceeding with foreclosures on presumptively unfair

that the bank sought to hire loan officers by claiming it was providing
valuable credit opportunities to new and previously neglected pools of
borrowers, though these borrowers were actually taken advantage of and
given inferior products. Interview with P.T., in Montclair, N.J., (Feb.
2006).
114
N.J. STAT. Ann. §56:8–2 (2009).
115
See Lambert, supra note 15, at 220314 (analyzing the applicability
of both disparate treatment and disparate impact theories to claims of
discriminatory credit marketing). See also Aleo & Svirsky, supra note 1;
Peter E. Mahoney, The End(s) of Disparate Impact: Doctrinal
Reconstruction, Fair Housing and Lending Law, and the Antidiscrimination
Principle, 47 EMORY L.J. 409 (1998).
116
See, e.g., Ware v. Indymac Bank, 534 F. Supp. 2d 835, 838 (N.D.
Ill. 2008); Newman v. Apex Fin. Group, Inc., No. 07 C 4475, 2008 WL
130924, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2008); Martinez v. Freedom Mortgage
Team, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 827, 834–35 (N.D. Ill. 2007); Johnson v.
Equicredit Corp. of Am., No. 01 C 5197, 2002 WL 448991, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 22, 2002); Assocs. Home Equity Servs. v. Troup, 343 N.J. Super.
254, 262 (App. Div. 2001).
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categories of mortgage loans.117 The complaint alleged not only
that the defendants engaged in unfair lending practices, but also
that targeting was used to steer minority borrowers to inferior
mortgages:
[The defendants] produced and distributed to its [sic]
employees, loan officers, and brokers written marketing
and educational materials explaining that the limited
choices available to black and Latino borrowers made
them good candidates for the [defendants’] subprime loan
products and that loan originators should focus on the
“emerging
markets”
of
black
and
Latino
homebuyers . . . [The
defendants]
described
this
“emerging market” as potential buyers who may have
credit concerns, a lack of familiarity with the credit
system, and difficulty demonstrating conventional credit
history.118
The combination of both anti-discrimination and consumer
fraud claims better captures the reality of targeted predatory
lending.
Existing anti-discrimination and consumer fraud
statutes are sufficiently broad to encompass these targeting
practices, and the lawsuits I have described have the potential to
shape the law to effectively address those practices. The level
of enforcement efforts, however, has not kept pace with the
severity of the problem.119 The next section addresses recent
legislation and proposals that have the potential to increase both
the efficacy and level of enforcement efforts.
IV. FEDERAL RESPONSES TO REVERSE REDLINING
The use of target marketing to funnel mortgages with
disadvantageous terms to residents of minority neighborhoods
warrants further attention from regulators as well as courts.
117

Commonwealth v. H&R Block, Inc., No. 2008-2474BLS1, 2008
Mass. Super. LEXIS 427, at *92 (Super. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008).
118
Complaint at ¶¶ 120, 121, Commonwealth v. H&R Block, Inc., No.
2008-2474BLS1, 2008 Mass. Super. LEXIS 427 (Super. Ct. June 3, 2008).
119
See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 77.
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While sellers have identified potential buyers based on their
susceptibility to fine-tuned sales practices for centuries, today’s
highly refined marketing technologies have increased the
efficiency of sharp selling practices and functioned as tools for
discrimination.120 Unfortunately, the profit-making frenzy that
developed during the peak subprime lending years caused not
only low-level scammers to prey on black and Latino borrowers,
but also drew larger lenders and banks into the picture. The
need for increased enforcement of existing law is self-evident,
but new regulation that focuses particularly on the practices
addressed in this article could prevent future problems while
remedying past ones.
The federal government has recently taken steps to ensure
greater regulation of mortgage brokers through the Secure and
Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act (the S.A.F.E.
Act). Part of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008,
the S.A.F.E. Act establishes uniform licensing and registration
requirements for “loan originators.”121 While reasonable
licensing requirements will likely help prevent some of the worst
originator abuses of the peak subprime lending years, more is
needed. Legislators and regulators also need to address the role
of lenders in pushing overly complex and predatory loans on
unsuspecting borrowers and ignoring standard underwriting
requirements in their rush to profit from assigning the mortgages
into securitized trusts.
The proposed Consumer Financial Protection Agency
(CFPA) could provide additional protections for borrowers.122
120

See Lambert, supra note 15, at 2203–14.
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289,
§ 1502(1), 122 Stat. 2850 (2008). This legislation provides a regulatory floor
for states, and specifies that HUD will establish a system for noncompliant
states; see also Bob Tedeschi, Cracking Down on Certain Brokers, N.Y.
TIMES, June 7, 2009, at RE6 (“[T]he F.H.A. is tightening its review of
mortgage professionals who are permitted to originate its loans.”); Bob
Tedeschi, Monitoring Loan Officers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2009, at RE9.
122
Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009, H.R. 3126,
111th Cong. (2009). In June of 2009, the Obama administration proposed a
single agency to regulate consumer financial products. See Mike Allen &
Eamon Javers, Barack Obama to Create Consumer Financial Protection
121
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For the first time, the CFPA would consolidate regulation of all
consumer financial products—including mortgages—under the
aegis of a single agency whose sole mission and priority would
be to safeguard the rights of consumers.123 This agency’s
mandate would be to “promote transparency, simplicity,
fairness, accountability and access in the market for consumer
financial products or services.”124 It would have authority, inter
alia, to prohibit unfair and deceptive practices in the financial

Agency, POLITICO, June 17, 2009, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/
0609/23790.html; see also Regulatory Restructuring: Enhancing Consumer
Financial Products Regulation: Hearing on H.R. 3126 Before the H.
Financial Servs. Comm., 111th Cong. (2009). Elizabeth Warren, Leo
Gottlieb Professor of Law, Harvard University, has made public statements
supporting administration proposal for new Consumer Financial Protection
Agency:
If we don’t feed high-risk, high-profit loans into the system, those
risks will not get sliced and diced into questionable asset-backed
securities and sold throughout the financial system. If we had a
Consumer Financial Protection Agency five years ago, Liar’s Loans
and no-doc loans would never have made it into the financial
marketplace—and never would have brought down our banking
system. The economic system took on so much risk—one household
at a time—that it destabilized our entire economy.
Id.
123
See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY
REFORM, A NEW FOUNDATION 55–70 (2009),
available
at
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf [hereinafter
TREASURY REPORT]; see also Binyamin Appelbaum, As Subprime Lending
Crisis Unfolded, Watchdog Fed Didn’t Bother Barking, WASH. POST, Sept.
27, 2009 (reporting that the Federal Reserve, which has enforcement
authority in this area, ignored evidence of subprime lending a abuses for
years); Edmund L. Andrews, Banks Balk at Agency Meant to Aid Consumers,
N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2009, at B1; Press Release, Ctr. for Responsible
Lending, Top Policies for Addressing the Foreclosure Crisis (Aug. 2009),
available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/policylegislation/congress/mortgage-solutions-final.pdf (informing readers that while
other agencies have made consumer protection a low priority, this new
agency would have the single mission of protecting consumers from financial
abuses in mortgages, credit cards, bank overdraft fees, and other financial
products).
124
H.R. 3126 § 121.
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products market.125 Moreover, the CFPA would restrict the
ability of originators—whether brokers or subprime lenders—to
mislead borrowers with inordinately complex financial
products.126 Finally—and most critical to this article—the agency
would have the authority to curb reverse redlining and the
racialization of consumer fraud by enforcing the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act and the Community Reinvestment Act.127
Bringing enforcement of antidiscrimination law under the same
umbrella as enforcement of other consumer protection law
should amplify the power of each to eradicate the array of illegal
practices that enabled the current crisis. The complexities of the
problem demand that each issue not be addressed in isolation.

125

Id. at §§ 131–39. The Obama administration recently withdrew its
original proposal to give the new agency the power to require lenders to offer
“plain-vanilla” mortgages, with simpler and more straightforward pricing.
See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 123, at 66; Damian Paletta and Kara
Scannell, Democrats Soften Financial Bill, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2009.
126
TREASURY REPORT, supra note 123, at 66.
127
Id. at 58–59, 69–70.

